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Abstract 
This article examines the application of the psy-sciences to the conduct of juvenile justice 
in Victoria in the period from 1940-1980, in order to reassess assumptions in 
contemporary sociology of law concerning psy-knowledge and judicial administration, 
welfare and justice, and their relations to liberal or conservative political mandates.  It 
seeks to understand the implications of shifts in the production of knowledge of the child 
in the justice system, by reporting on analysis of both clinical and administrative files of 
the Children’s Court Clinic in this period.  The study documents how particular kinds of 
offenders became know in order to be properly managed, and questions the extent of 
separations between science and juvenile justice administration. 
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Introduction  
The aim of this study is to investigate systems of knowledge that have been applied to 
understanding the child in the context of judicial administration.  Such an inquiry allows 
us to question common assumptions in the sociology of law, understandings which would 
tie the shifting role of the psy-sciences in justice administration to, for example, 
arguments about progressive reform or historical failure, abandonment of science to 
economic rationalism, or historical pendulum-swings between essential categories of 
welfare and justice.  This paper reports on an examination of Victorian Children’s Court 
Clinic case files as well as Court administrative files, which show the Clinic as a nexus in 
the cross-talk of judicial, educational, correctional and health discourse. It concentrates 
on the time span from the 1940s to the 1980s.  We review a number of themes in the 
sociology of law concerning the relations between psy-knowledge and justice 
administration; document historical changes in the shaping of knowledge of the child in 
this period;  sketch out elements of the functioning of the psy-sciences in knowing the 
child as ‘sex offender’ and ‘habitual thief’; and finally, conclude with some remarks 
about the historical meshing of the psy-sciences and justice administration, and its 
implications for analysis of juvenile justice.         
 
History, psy-knowledges, justice 
The study addresses a number of broad and intersecting themes in the sociology of law 
that depend on particular historical understandings of change in the relations between 
psy-knowledge and the administration of juvenile justice.  First, there are a broad set of 
perspectives that generically might be described as apologist in their historical 
understandings.  Positivism sought to understand biological, psychological and social 
factors that predisposed individuals to committing crime, rendering the individual 
susceptible to reform (White and Haines, 2003).  Shifts in techniques for knowing the 
child were motivated by a spirit of reform,  in which the child is discovered as the subject 
of due process and the embodiment of a set of ‘rights’.  Extrapolating from this, the focus 
 
of our present study—a  children’s court clinic—could  be understood as an extension of 
the principle of parens patriae or, conversely, as part of a paternalistic and patriarchal 
ideology.  As we will show, from the early 1970s lawyers and welfare workers 
challenged presumptions about what is best for the child at the same time as reaffirming 
the child as a bearer of legal rights. The earlier claims of the psy-worker to best know the 
child would be met with counter-claims from other professionals who wished to occupy 
this mantel, such as the social worker, the welfare worker, and lawyers acting for the 
child (Jaggs, 1986).  
 
 A further perspective, recent and influential, is that the psy-sciences – the 
techniques of a positivist, individualist, interventionist criminal justice system—have 
experienced a loss of faith in their ability to know the criminal mind, and more 
specifically the child-as-offender.  The location of knowledge of the offending child has 
shifted from the psy-sciences because of their failure in terms of truth-value: science got 
it wrong, has been naïve, or has failed to deliver on its promise to scientifically know the 
child.  There has been a ‘collapse of faith in the rehabilitative ideal’ (Hughes 1998: 59), 
or alternatively, penal and correctional policies have cultivated a misplaced attachment to 
individual causes of crime (Borowski, 2003).  Some would argue that longer-term 
experience has shown that reforms such as sex-offender programs simply do not work 
(Wilson, quoted in Alcorn, 1999).  More critical accounts identify  ‘criminologies of the 
other’ which dispatch young offenders into anti-scientific categories such as evil or 
wicked (Garland 1996: 461); this theme is strongly affirmed in key sociology of law texts 
 
(Smandych, 1999, White and Haines, 2003), while its more radical implications for 
juvenile justice institutions have also been explored (Ainsworth, 1991). 
  
Related to the above perspective is the theme that the administration of justice is 
tied to broader political mandates insofar as a perceived swing of the pendulum from 
'welfare' to 'justice' is tied to swings from a more 'liberal' model, which seeks to 
understand, to a more conservative 'just deserts' model which seeks to punish (Naffine et 
al, 1990; Naffine and Wundersitz 1994; O'Malley, 1994; 1999). Historical periodising of 
the shift from welfarism to conservatism is punctuated with evidence like mandatory 
sentencing, non-discretionary ‘truth-in-sentencing’ legislation, antisocial behaviour 
orders, or curfews.  Changes in broad political law-and-order mandates map directly onto 
the functioning of the courts (Tame, 1991; Hogg and Brown, 1998).  Here, the role of the 
social and psychological sciences is seen as ignored rather than discredited. The theme is 
captured in the UK with the Home Secretary’s pronouncement, at the time of the 
Venables and Thompson trial, that it was time to ‘condemn a little more’ and ‘understand 
a little less’ (Haydon and Scraton, 2001).  In the US it is evident in, for example, 
psychologists' alarm over the increasing inclusion of juvenile sex offenders in registration 
and notification under Megan’s Law, contrary to the doctrine of parens patriae and 
counter to the reasoning of contemporary psychology (Pithers and Gray, 1998; Trivits 
and Reppucci, 2002).  This perceived shift from welfare to justice might be accounted for 
as a move to economic rationalism, wherein the science of penetrating the psycho-social 
reasons behind crime is displaced by actuarial calculations in which the subject of 
judicial administration is refigured as a bundle of ‘risk factors’—the bearer of a set of 
 
probabilities rather than a set of psycho-social pathologies (Simon, 1988; Feeley and 
Simon, 1994; Ericson and Haggerty, 1999; Day, Howells and Rickwood, 2004).  
Alternatively, investments in opportunities for therapy and reform are replaced by 
investments in institutions for ‘warehousing’ populations, with little pretence of either 
punishment or rehabilitation (Pratt, 1989).  
  
Our approach carries certain theoretical presumptions about historical change.  We 
have some discontent with understandings which situate change in centralized mandates 
of power ‘from above’. We believe such understandings are unsuited to the context of 
modern liberal democracies, which are marked by dispersed, decentralised and often 
contradictory agencies of administration, and which produce knowledge of their subjects 
in often quite localised ways and according to their own specific administrative concerns 
(Foucault, 1988; 1991).  Modern liberal democracies are further marked by aspirations to 
produce self-governing individuals who will be amenable to the advice of experts (Rose, 
1990; 1999).  On both accounts liberal agencies of government cannot be characterized as 
apparatuses of a negative, repressive State power;  nor alternatively, within a teleological 
spirit of reform in which the reformer is understood as freeing up the constraints of the 
repressive, conservative impositions of old.  Borrowing a phrase from Foucault (1977), 
we seek understanding in more ‘ignoble archives’ where the operations of a generative 
power might be identified in those ‘capillary’ moments of exchange, where, for example, 
clinician might come up against patient, and petty bureaucrat against clinician.  But we 
also argue that those moments of exchange are also moments of transmutation, in which 
the actions of the doctor become the actions of the lawyer, those of the ‘social’ worker 
 
become those of the psychologist, and so on. The question under investigation is not so 
much the effects of psy-expertise on justice administration, or the relations of science to 
government—questions which take for granted the presence of a body of knowledge that 
is brought to bear (or not) on a set of administrative proceedings.  Rather, we ask: what 
shifts take place in the shaping of a space created for the production of knowledge of the 
child, specifically, as the subject of judicial administration?    
 
Knowing the child: psy-science and the doctor 
We proceed from the premise that in order to effectively administer a population, a 
governing agency needs to know that population.  In terms of the administration of 
justice, a justice system needs to know a child in order to effectively administer justice.  
A Children’s Court Clinic was formally established in Melbourne in 1945 to provide the 
possibility of knowing the child as the subject of better judicial administration of 
children.   
 
When it is considered by the Magistrates of a Court that further information 
would be desirable to enable them to form an opinion as to the best method of 
dealing with any child, they are now able to refer such case to the Clinic to have 
an examination and an investigation made and a comprehensive report submitted 
to them (Victoria, 1946).  
 
Each child appearing before the court would have a summary report written by a 
psychiatrist that would also have included in it a psychological report, a form showing 
 
the results of a physical examination (again usually performed by the psychiatrist) as well 
as a ‘social report’ which in earlier days had been performed by a psychologist, but by 
the mid-40s was carried out by the newly-appointed Clinic social worker.  In most cases 
the Clinic would receive, via the Court, and after an adjournment, the police statements 
about the child’s alleged offence.  These in turn would initiate a series of separate forms, 
detailing the statement by the child, by the arresting officer, and by a probation officer if 
the child was already under probation.  By the early 1940s it was the Clinic that received 
all the available information on the child. The court then typically adjourned the case for 
two weeks for a special investigation by the Clinic.  Depending on the charge, or if the 
child lived in the country, the child could be remanded to the Royal Park (Melbourne) 
children’s home.  Prior to the establishment of the Clinic, the Court sought another kind 
of expertise, principally that of the probation officer.  If particular knowledge was 
required of a subject before sentencing or a decision about disposition, it was formally 
sought through an adjournment and a request to the probation officer for a social 
background report.  A probation officer’s report was tended to the court, and the 
probation officer’s claim to know the child was respected (Victoria, 1940, 1941).   By 
1945, the kind of knowledge sought in similar circumstances would now be provided by 
a psychiatrist.  The authoritative voice within that space became that of a doctor.  We 
might pause here to ask: why the doctor?  Why this assumption that a doctor’s knowledge 
would provide the kind of knowledge that could best be brought to bear on the successful 
administration of this population?   
 
 
The psychiatrist was not alone in the Clinic. From its full-time establishment it was 
also staffed by a psychologist, a social worker and a trained nurse who were all officers 
of the Public Health Department.  These personnel did not furnish the Court directly with 
knowledge of the child; rather, their knowledge was mediated through the psychiatrist 
under a single ‘Medical Report’.  His duties were:  
 
to supervise the activities of the Clinic, medically examine juvenile delinquents, 
and furnish reports to the Children's Court … Qualifications: To be a legally 
qualified medical practitioner’ (Victorian Government Gazette, March 15, 1944). 
  
There is no doubt the doctor was in charge. The duties of the psychologist were ‘the 
psychological examination of juvenile delinquents under the direction of the medical 
officer’ (Victorian Government Gazette, Nov. 1, 1944).  In July 1945, the Government 
Medical Officer noted that psychologist was to be ‘definitely instructed that he is under 
the direction of Dr Bailey’ (Department of Human Services Victoria [DHSV] Archives, 
FN X82. General Administrative Files [GAF]: Children’s Court Clinic, Correspondence 
[CCCC]: Feb. 1944-Sept. 1948).  In February 1944, the Victorian Council of Mental 
Hygiene elaborated on their roles: the psychologist was ‘to be able to cooperate in 
treatment, particularly as regards educational aspects, under the direction of the 
psychiatrist’.  The social worker ‘… should work directly under the psychiatrist who will 
require the following: 
 
 
(a) investigations and social histories to assist him in diagnosis and prognosis  (b) 
attempts at family or individual readjustment under his guidance (c) organisation 
of and participation in case conferences with magistrates, probation officers, 
teachers, and institutional staffs (d) liaison between the probation officers and the 
clinic (DHSV Archives, FN X82. GAF, CCCC: Feb. 1944-Sept. 1948).   
. 
Dr Bailey was Assistant Government Medical Officer, spending most of his time ‘… 
occupied with psychiatric examinations and reports on prisoners in Pentridge [Gaol]’, and 
the establishment of the clinic had to be delayed until he could be formally relieved of 
these duties (DHSV Archives, FN X82. GAF, CCCC: Feb. 1944-Sept. 1948, 
Correspondence to Govt. Medical Officer, July 1944.)  The chain of authority was 
unquestioned. 
 
Yet we know that this space for judicial knowledge changes.  Three decades after 
its establishment, the hierarchy under which the psychologist and the social worker speak 
to the doctor, who then speaks to the Courts, was displaced.  In 1979, the Psychiatrist-
Superintendent of the Children's Court Clinic objected strongly to what was understood 
to be a challenge to the authority and expertise of the psychiatrist by a welfare 
bureaucracy, which pitted the authority of the welfare (including social) worker over and 
against that of the psy-clinician.  The psychiatrist’s objections stemmed from legislative 
changes ushering in the new Community Welfare Services bureaucracy that replaced the 
Social Welfare Department in the late 1970s.  The new Department of Community 
Welfare Services (DCWS) was accompanied by an amended Act making the psychiatrist 
 
largely beholden to the Department and the social worker.  The contentious part of the 
Bill (as amended in July 1979) was in Section 31 (2):  
 
A child or young person shall not be admitted to the care of the Department under 
the provisions of this section  unless the court is first satisfied that all reasonable 
steps have been taken by the Director-General or an authorised children's 
protection agency to provide such services as are necessary to enable the child or 
young person to remain in the care of his family and that admission to the care of 
the Department is in the best interests of the child or young person in the 
circumstances (Victoria, 1979. Emphasis added).  
 
DCWS explained the procedures under the new Act for providing reports to the 
Children’s Court preparing what were called ‘pre-sentence’ reports.  Quoting a section of 
the Victorian Children's Court Act (1973), it explained that on receipt of a request, a field 
worker of a regional Centre would prepare a comprehensive report   
 
… which sets out an account of the results of an investigation into the 
antecedents, home environment (including parental control), companions, 
education, school attendance, employment, habits, recreation, character, 
reputation, disposition, medical history and physical or mental defects (if any) of 
the child, and any other relevant matters (Public Records Office of Victoria 
[PROV] VPRS 6344 Children's Court General Correspondence Files [CCC GCF], 
August 1979.)  
 
 It was described as a ‘social history’.  It detailed the circumstances in which the family 
was living and any previous contact with the Department and other organisations. It 
would also include a recommendation to the court on the possible disposition of a case.  
If an option other than wardship was to be recommended, this report alone would be 
forwarded to the Court.  The Department advised that a report under Section 31 (2) of the 
Community Welfare Services Act would not be completed because ‘the Director-General 
was able to provide services to enable the child to remain in the care of his family’ 
(PROV VPRS 6344 CCC GCF, August 1979).    
 
Both the Clinic and the Court objected to the changed reporting responsibilities.  The 
psychiatrist wrote to the Director of Mental Health: 
  
 I refer you to ….  Point 6.0, in which psychiatric services are to ‘work through’ 
DCWS, and to 6.1 where reports are to be forwarded automatically to the 
Department.  Reports will not be made available routinely to anyone in DCWS 
unless signed authorisations from parent/guardian and child are provided … I refer 
you also to Sec. 25 (1) and Sec. 49 of the Children's Court Act which clearly states 
our reports are ‘for the information of the Court’ … I have received no verbal or 
written communication … as to the reasons we have not been authorised. Informally 
I have heard it is because DCWS has to pay for Wards of the State and feel that only 
they should be able to make such a recommendation … I do hope that on my return 
from leave that there has been a satisfactory resolution to the crisis, and that 
 
psychiatry is recognised as being a professional discipline of at least equal status to 
that of social work (PROV VPRS 6344 CCC GCF, August 1979).  
 
There were additional objections. The new Act had created difficulties in attracting 
consultant psychiatric staff to the Clinic, a position made unpopular ‘… mainly because the 
doctors do not have final case planning responsibility—a problem of which you will be well 
aware at the present time in relation to the new Community Welfare Services Act’.  The 
psychiatrist asserted that Magistrates had also changed their practices because of uncertainty 
about who has the authority to make a recommendation of wardship to the Court: 
 
… as a flow on from the new Act we are finding that many of the young people are 
now being committed to the institutions on medium to long-term sentences. Where 
previously they may have been made wards of the State. This necessitates continued 
treatment and case management by the psychiatric personnel as the social workers at 
the Regional Office have minimal case planning responsibility for youngsters on 
sentences. It is therefore an ever increasing component of our work and certainly 
many of the adolescents are very disturbed and in some cases aggressive, requiring 
intensive investigations and follow-up treatment (PROV VPRS 6344 CCC GCF, 
October 1979.) 
 
    The Children's Court Stipendiary Magistrate confirmed the confusion and delays.  He too 
implied that the changes represented a challenge to a body of psy- expertise by lesser 
experts.  He wrote to the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate: 
 
 A number of children are now in custody awaiting the Director-General’s replies to 
requests for reports.  In some of these cases, there has already been a thorough pre-
sentence investigation with a recommendation of Wardship yet, a separate report 
under 31 (2) is now required before a Court can admit … There seems to be a point 
of view held by some Community Welfare Services Officers that the Sub-Section is 
complied with, if the Department approves a recommendation of Wardship. This 
view is not held by the magistrates here.  In the case in point last week the Children’s 
Clinic recommended to me (after a long history of involvement) that a child be 
admitted to care.  An officer of the Community Welfare Services Department … had 
the impertinence to seek to obtain from the Clerk of Courts, the Clinic report, before 
it had reached me, and to ‘Countersign’ it.  An attempt by a Social Worker to ‘vet’ a 
Clinic report, coming as it does from highly trained and experienced people is 
outrageous  (PROV VPRS 6344 CCC GCF, August 1979). 
 
The Psychiatrist Superintendent of the Clinic indicated that she was not opposed to 
social workers per se but very opposed to them working independently of a psychiatric 
overseer.  To gain clear psychological perspectives of family dynamics, a social worker 
report was inadequate unless the writer had specific clinical training in child psychotherapy 
or family therapy, a situation which rarely exists in social workers outside psychiatric 
facilities: 
 
 
… the standard and attention to detail of our clinical work and reports is extremely 
high, and it seems meaningless, if not professionally impertinent, for a DCWS Social 
Worker who has not interviewed either the child or family in question to countersign 
and approve one of the Clinic's reports (PROV VPRS 6344 CCC GCF, August 1979). 
 
It is clear that by the 1980s formal court knowledge of the child is no longer 
mediated through the voice of the psy-doctor.  The authority of psychiatry could no 
longer be taken for granted, within and beyond the Clinic, in the way that it was taken for 
granted in earlier days.  Now, the know-how of the Clinic is but one of a new multiplicity 
of voices, from a multiplicity of locales, who often speak at cross-purposes.   
 
Knowing the child: a multiplicity of voices 
The psychologist at the Children's Court Clinic provided a first hand portrayal of these 
multiple voices when she described shifts in expertise following the changes of reporting 
arrangements to the Court.   In the early 1980s, in approximately 10 percent of cases 
passing through the Children's Court, and almost invariably in cases of an uncontrolled 
application, a referral was made by the magistrates for a clinic assessment to the 
Children's Court Clinic. The magistrates might also call on DCWS agencies for a pre-
sentence report when they wanted more data to help them make a disposition. But when a 
comprehensive clinical work-up was required, according to the Clinic Psychologist, 
Court Clinic referral is most often needed.  Court Clinic personnel were routinely given 
access to the young person's statement to police and to all written submissions and 
reports to the magistrates when they were asked to assess. 
 
 …This issue of when reports are tended to the Clinic is important because it 
means that the government psychologists and those of other professional 
disciplines working at this clinic are rarely involved in the process of proving 
guilt; they are merely to offer an assessment after that event, by request of the 
court, and to give advice about a disposition in the light of their assessment.  
Further, except under exceptional circumstances, there is no cross-examination of 
the author of that report by barristers, since it was especially commissioned for 
the magistrate alone… (Brown, 1981, emphasis added). 
  
 But now all this changes.  The psychologist reported that probably as a result of 
changes in the Act and the role of the Children's Protection Society in the Courts, 
psychologists and psychiatrists from hospital settings and from private practice were 
appearing in the Children's court, although not yet in great numbers.  These ‘outside’ 
psychologists, almost exclusively in cases where there was alleged child abuse, were 
being called by barristers acting on behalf of the parents or by the Children's Protection 
Society.  Often such cases had been initiated by the Children's Hospital, through police or 
the Children's Protection Society.  They were called to give evidence about the child’s 
emotional adjustment so that magistrates could decide about Care Applications. 
However, the Clinic Psychologist pointed out that the evidence of the psychologists 
called as expert witnesses were now almost exclusively in relation to matters of proof: 
 
 
In this potentially adversary situation, counter expert witnesses can be called, they 
can be cross-examined and, until the legal point of proof is reached, it is usual for 
such cross-examination to take place before child and parents (Brown, 1981). 
 
So now the presumption to know what is best for the child is challenged by other 
professionals, and by other ways of knowing the child—for instance, as the bearer of 
legal rights.  The Clinic Psychologist acknowledges an anxiety that the singularity of the 
Clinic psy-worker’s claim to best know the child was under threat—a threat that would 
usher in an adversarialism counter to the foundational principles of the Children’s Court. 
According to this account, the psy-sciences had little prior involvement in establishing 
questions of legal proof.   
 
    The challenges from the early 1970s led by both lawyers and welfare workers were 
seen as ‘about time’:  in the spirit of a progressive reform that sought to more truly know 
the child’s ‘best interests’ (Scutt, 1977; Ainsworth, 1992).  Indeed, the welfare worker 
was a major protagonist in this kind of narrative of challenge and enlightenment, against 
medical social control.  Jaggs’s (1986) account of this period put the penultimate moment 
of psy-dominance as the Juvenile Delinquency Advisory Committee, chaired by Justice 
Barry (Victoria, 1956), whose membership included prominent psychiatrist in the Mental 
Health Authority, Alan Stoller.   According to Jaggs, the Barry Report ‘… endorsed the 
contemporary psychiatric view that delinquency was, in effect, a recognizable syndrome 
which called for massive preventive measures as well as early diagnosis and treatment of 
individual cases’ (Jaggs, 1986: 163).  This finding located the population administered by 
 
the Court into a conceptual framework of ‘deviancy’ and locked its attendant institutions 
and personnel into a conceptual ‘specialist’ framework of ‘diagnosis’ and ‘treatment’.  
For Jaggs, this would only be broken by a lobby characterized as ‘avant-garde welfare 
thinking’, as inscribed in the later Norgard Committee report (Victoria, 1976).   The 
aspirations of welfare were seen to be brought to fruition by as much as possible 
diverting away from the Court a juvenile population that all too frequently had been 
placed under legal sanction by a socially controlling psy-science of deviancy.   
 
How the Clinic knows the ‘sex offender’ 
From evidence in the case files in the 1940s, clinicians dealing with male sex offenders 
generally exhibit an air of dispassionate confidence.  Clinicians generally understood that 
this kind of offending was an aberration due to a lack of sex education combined with the 
influence of surrounding ‘sex talk’, or of ‘seeing things’.  There was little digging for 
pathologies, and where, for instance, ‘perversions’ or organic causes are cited as reasons 
behind the offence, these reasons are usually coupled with evidence of some degree of 
‘mental dullness’ [sic] if not mental defect.  
 
An example: A fifteen-year old boy was charged in 1945 with unlawful assault of a 
girl, aged 18, who he attempted to kiss in a railway carriage. Examined in the Clinic in 
1945, his statement to the police is as follows: ‘…I had the idea in mind that I would like 
to kiss the girl but if she said “No” it would not matter to me….  The Probation Officer 
reported to the Court that he had been ‘here more than a year ago for Indecent Assault on 
a young girl, and his case was adjourned’.  After this appearance, the boy's case was 
 
adjourned for two weeks and he was referred to the Clinic. The Clinic Social Worker, on 
her report of her home visit during this adjournment, noted that the ‘present offence does 
not appear to have been of a strictly sexual character…he kissed many girls without any 
objections…on “V.P” day. He has read a book entitled “Plain Words” but does not 
entirely understand it.’  The psychologist noted in his report that the boy was ‘of normal 
intelligence but retarded educationally … Intellectually he is sluggish’.  The boy's  
Physical Examination form would describe him as ‘Physically a somewhat sluggish type 
with a tendency to adiposity…Probably a case of mild endocrine imbalance.’  In his 
preliminary notes, the Clinic Psychiatrist noted: ‘On VP night saw an airman having 
coitus with a girl up a lane…Saw an American doing it to a woman right under a light in 
the Alexander Gardens about 2 months ago’(DHSV Archives, AN 93/293/1-8 Children’s 
Court Clinic Case Files [CCCF]), 1945). 
 
In his final Report to the Court the Psychiatrist concluded that the child’s ‘previous 
offence (indecent assault) was apparently impulsive in nature and prompted by curiosity’; 
that his present offence was ‘the result of lack of sex education, but that there may be 
several contributory factors…Physical and mental lethargy due to glandular dysfunction 
may also be an underlying cause’.  He further suggested that a ‘course of appropriate 
medical treatment with a glandular extract would be beneficial’.  This kind of treatment 
was not carried out at the Clinic, where ‘treatment’ was largely confined to sex 
instruction.  The psychiatrist recommended that ‘attendance at the Clinic for sex 
instruction will probably solve his sex difficulties’ and that, indeed, ‘absenteeism [from 
work] presents a greater problem’ (DHSV Archives AN 93/293/1-8 CCCCF 1945). 
 
  
Our second example is of a boy, first seen in the clinic in late 1945, after appearing 
before the Court on a charge of being a ‘Rogue and vagabond for that he did wilfully and 
obscenely expose himself in a public place’. The Psychiatrist noted that the ‘psychiatric 
examination of this boy revealed that his offences were due to the presence of the 
following contributory factors: Marked intellectual dullness (I.Q. – 78); Precocious 
sexuality at the age of 10;  Excessive masturbation; Undescended left testicle giving rise 
to mental conflict and feeling of organ inferiority; Habitual exhibitionism during the past 
three years; Lack of adequate sex knowledge.  The psychiatrist advises that ‘physical 
maldevelopment should first be corrected’ through referral to the Royal Melbourne 
Hospital, and that the case should be adjourned for a further six months for this medical 
treatment and for sex instruction at the Clinic. The psychologist notes in a progress report 
in March of the following year that the boy visited for sex instruction: 
 
2/2/46. Visit. Introductory talk 
9/2/46. Visit Second talk. Differentiation in living things. 
16/2/46. Visit. Third talk. Differences – Grades – Reduction – Civilization 
23/2/46. Visit. Fourth talk. Origins 
2/3/46.  Visit. Fifth talk. (DHSV Archives AN 93/293/1-8 CCCCF, 1946). 
 
 
The above examples are representative of ongoing casework on child sex offenders.  
What are we to make of contemporary claims about the ‘failure’ of the social and 
 
psychological sciences in the past, and the need to give up on ‘social problems’?  A 
senior criminologist claims there was enormous optimism after World War 2 that, by 
rectifying the ills of society, we could eliminate a lot of what we now call ‘evil’:  
 
We’ve suddenly realised that evil is beyond social problems … We’re not, to give 
an example, good at sex offender programs … They don’t work. We’re not very 
good at changing deep-seated psychological problems, contrary to the rhetoric we 
had 20 years ago. Our optimism is not matched by empirical facts (Wilson, 
quoted in Alcorn, 1999). 
 
The themes about the past can be countered with the claim that programmes for knowing 
and dealing with the sex offender have worked perfectly at different historical moments, 
in as much as they deliver a subject who can be known, and acted upon, with confidence.  
The mood is captured in 1944 in the Annual Report of the Children’s Court by its 
Stipendiary Magistrate L R Ripper: 
 
With the progress of the medical and psychological sciences we have come to 
understand and to treat problems that at one time were considered enigmatic and 
unintelligible.  From the psychological or medical viewpoint the sex offender no 
longer presents a mystery … the attitude taken up is that they will be required to 
respect society, and endeavour to comply with its demands, as well as seeking its 
help in reform … Juvenile sex offenders are taken to be sociological and not 
merely psychological cases (Victoria, 1945). 
 
 How the Clinic knows the ‘habitual thief’ 
Investigations of the foundations in Australia of the doctor’s role in establishing 
soundness of mind, and advising on how best to administer that individual’s affairs, 
suggest that the doctor’s position as judge has less to do with his credentials as man-of-
science.  His main credentials are those of juror, and it is as a member of a jury that he 
enters the field of what would later be called mental health (McCallum, 2001: 38-40)  
Here then, we return to the question with which we began: Why the doctor?  Why the 
assumption that a doctor’s knowledge would provide the kind of knowledge that could 
best be brought to bear on the successful administration of a population under legal 
sanction?  A study of the entry of the psychiatrist into the Clinic suggests that he comes 
equipped, first and foremost, with a set of juridical credentials.   
 
Consider the following evidence from the Children’s Court case files in 1946. A 
boy, approaching 16 is examined at Melbourne’s Pentridge prison at request of Chief 
Probation Officer ‘as he is to appear before the Children’s Court…on a charge of 
escaping from legal custody’. The psychiatrist notes: 
 
When asked what offences he was charged with at present he stated that he didn’t 
know. ‘They tell you nothing here.’ On further interrogation however, he said that 
he believed he was being charged with stealing a motor car and some petrol three 
weeks ago. He later escaped from custody and was at large for about 14 days before 
recapture. He has been in the metropolitan Gaol for about a week. 
 
When asked about his personal history he became extremely evasive. He adopted 
various subterfuges, to avoid giving the necessary information. He frequently 
pleaded that he could not remember, and this applied to events that happened as 
recently as last year.  At other times he would say ‘Ask my grandparents they will 
know,’ or ‘ask … [his Probation Officer] etc. Further questioning often revealed 
that he was well able to remember events which he at first said he could not recall. 
He appeared so evasive and untruthful and his replies were so contradictory in 
many instances that it was quite impossible to get a coherent history from him 
either in relation to his home life, education or unemployment. It was therefore 
found necessary to fall back upon the Social Report and Probation Officer’s Report 
and discuss the relevant parts of these reports with him. 
 
Boy’s attitude during examination: The above history was elicited in disjointed 
fashion and after considerable difficulty. D was extremely unco-operative. He was 
insolent throughout, not only in his speech but in his general bearing. During 
physical examination he stood in a slovenly fashion with a cheeky grin on his face 
and carried out instructions in a reluctant manner. This insolent attitude persisted 
throughout the examination though he was repeatedly advised to alter it. He 
appeared very cunning and was clever at evading direct questions and in giving non 
committal replies. Thus when an attempt was made to ascertain his attitude to his 
delinquency he stated that he was unable to understand my questions. On several 
times I found it necessary to tell him that he was deliberately wasting my time. 
Conclusion: The main factor apparent is an emotional conflict regarding his father. 
 
The cause of this could not be definitely ascertained. D is an undisciplined type, 
due apparently to lax parental control during his formative years. An endeavour to 
correct this later may be the cause of present friction between father and son. The 
boy’s present mood is one of insolent defiance instead of repentance…The 
unfavourable impression created by him at present is distinctly at variance with the 
account rendered by his probation officer. This discrepancy is hard to explain but I 
feel that he has been deceiving her. He is quite clever and cunning enough for that 
…  
Copy of … [probationary officer’s] letter perused. This tends to confirm my 
previous opinion as set out above (DHSV Archives AN 93/293/1-8 CCCCF, 1946, 
emphasis added). 
  
In his final Report to the Court the Psychiatrist states: 
 
This boy’s delinquency is the manifestation of a serious character defect, due to 
lack of adequate supervision and moral training in his formative years. He is 
lacking in self discipline. He is self centred, unstable, and unreliable, though it 
appears that he can temporarily assume a good front when it suits him. He could 
be classified as a psychopathic personality. Though he has been in gaol for several 
days he shows no sign of repentance. His present mood appears to be one of 
sullen defiance. 
 
 
The prognosis is unfavourable. He may temporarily respond to probation but is 
almost certain to lapse again He requires moral re-education and discipline, and I 
cannot see how this can be achieved other than by committing him to an 
institution  (DHSV Archives AN 93/293/1-8 CCCCF, 1946, emphasis added). 
 
 A further example is of a boy charged with breaking and entering. The psychiatrists 
report reads:   
 
There is a past history of wandering away from home in early childhood. When a 
small boy he would steal coins from his mother’s purse. At the age of eight he 
began stealing small articles from chain stores. At the age of ten he first got into 
trouble over stealing. Other similar offences have followed culminating in his 
present crimes…He admits that he finds it hard to resist the temptation to steal 
whenever a suitable opportunity presents itself… 
Conclusions: this boy is a habitual truant and an habitual thief.  He is morally 
defective and is not amenable to control at home. 
Recommendation: Placement in a suitable institution and moral reeducation are 
indicated (DHSV Archives AN 93/293/1-8 CCCCF, 1946, emphasis added.) 
 
 The evidence suggests that the psychiatrist was thoroughly enmeshed in judicial 
practice. To argue this, it is necessary to engage with the question of the judicial nature of 
the psychiatrist’s role, and his authority.  He determined whether any psychopathic 
history may be elicited, say an alcoholic uncle, a grandmother in a mental institution, or a 
 
sibling who is mentally defective.  Next, he determined whether the child exhibits 
dishonesty—is at all evasive in his/her answers, or has a history of dishonesty beyond the 
formal history (police report, probation officer’s report) provided in the brief 
accompanying the Court referral.  He went about this in two ways.  He used the 
information on the social worker’s report of her home visit, and/or the probation officer’s 
report, to see if that information, and the information provided by the child, matched.  
Then he interrogated the child and/or parents to see if he could elicit any ‘evidence’ of 
stealing beyond that provided in formal charges.  Very frequently there was an 
‘admission’ to stealing from the mother’s purse at an early age.  If there was enough to 
suggest a ‘habit’—that the child has become a ‘habitual thief’ – then he generally 
recommended institutional placement.    
 
 In his eliciting ‘confessions’ and his manner of using other sources to 
(cross)examine the child,  the psychiatrist’s mode of operating—his means of arriving at 
a ‘diagnosis’ of ‘habitual thief—was distinctly prosecutorial.  It might be argued that he 
serves, from the beginning, less as ‘scientific’ expert than as an extension of the judicial 
apparatus.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
We suggested that this investigation allows us to question the certainty of understandings 
which pivot on political shifts, such as from welfarism to conservatism.  The analyses of 
contemporary criminologists in their critique of economic rationalism are important, 
especially in their attention to actuarial technologies (Pratt, 1989; Feeley and Simon; 
 
O’Malley, 1992?).  But the notion that a body of expertise has been thwarted by a 
bureaucracy fails to recognize the thorough enmeshment of those activities we commonly 
think of as ‘science’, and those we think of as ‘bureaucratic’.  As Latour points out, the 
bureau of the scientist in the laboratory and the bureau of a bureaucracy have more in 
common than we might like to think (Latour and Woolgar, 1986).  And the Clinic, we 
argue, was a laboratory for the production of subjects amenable to a set of administrative 
aspirations.  In seeking a greater understanding of the relations between judicial 
administration and the psy-sciences, we consider it necessary to test, rather than to 
assume, the givenness of a separation of psy-scientific activities and administrative 
activities, and the attendant historical understandings that one causes changes in the 
other.   
 
These close interrelations were evident at the Clinic’s establishment.  The 
Stipendiary Probation Officer, an officer of the Court, actually became the first Clinic 
Psychologist (Children's Court Annual Report, 1945).  Further, the principal technology 
used by the psychologist (the IQ test) was developed less as a diagnostic tool for the well-
being of the individual but rather, quite overtly, to serve the administrative needs of an 
education bureaucracy bogged down in attempts to sort a newly massed population (Binet 
and Simon, 1948).   In the case of the psychiatrist, the evidence presented here might 
temper claims that the Clinic was as an institution founded on the principles of scientific 
objectivity—‘rarely involved in the process of proving guilt’ (Brown 1982)- and was 
only later besieged by outsiders who would distort the traditional role of scientific 
objectivity.   
 
  The crossings over of administrative and scientific activities—their ongoing 
enmeshment—is not a one-way affair.  If, in its foundational moment we see the psy-
scientist acting as something of judge-and-juror, we know too that there will be calls, in 
the 1980s, for the judge to become something of a scientist: 
 
Decision makers in the Children's Court should have all the requirements for 
magistrates in the adult courts, together with training in a social or behavioural 
science… (Victoria, 1984: 404). 
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